The quest for an authoritarian personality following World War II had identified two forms of authoritarian attitudes before 2000: Right Wing Authoritarianism or RWA, and Social Dominance Orientation or SDO. RWA is a passive sort of authoritarianism which is concerned with group membership, group norms, and the enforcement of those norms. SDO is an agressive sort of authoritarianism that endorses inequality between groups.
Research began to move toward explanatory studies. John Jost and his collaborators published a review in 2003 which attempts to explain why people adopt an ideology of political conservatism, “Political Conservatism as Motivated Social Cognition.” That paper reviewed existing research to discover, in light of “motivated cognition,” what factors seem significant in promoting a conservative worldview.
“Political Conservatism as Motivated Social Cognition” evaluates the results of a range of previous studies to test hypotheses about why people adopt an ideology of political conservatism. The factors that appear in these hypotheses are mostly behavioral tendencies. Thus in a way the paper returns to the sorts of “personality factors” that Adorno and his collaborators had in mind when they began their search for an authoritarian personality.
Their analysis takes the view that conservative ideology, like any other ideology, may at least partly be the result of “motivated cognition.” Motivated cognition is reasoning that is influenced by factors outside of logic and information. It has been suggested that conservative opinions may reduce fear, anxiety, and uncertainty; they may avoid change, disruption, and ambiguity; they may explain, order, and justify inequalities between groups and among individuals.
These authors hold that, while there may be psychological motivations behind belief systems, ideologies may still be logical and justifiable in the sense that they adhere to logic and are to some extent consistent with real-world feedback. Political attitudes can be both principled and motivated. [Jost 2003, p. 340]
According to this view beliefs are formed from both informational and motivational inputs. Information provides evidence, which may have a greater or lesser effect depending upon the source of the information and the individual’s relationship to the source. The truth of information may have more or less importance in coming to a belief. Conversely, the existence of motivated thinking doesn’t determine the truth or falsity of the beliefs itself. The theory of motivated cognition is intermediate between a theory that people come to beliefs by cool rational analysis, and a theory that beliefs are primarily determined by hot motivations. [Jost 2003, p. 341]
Cognitive motivators include directional and nondirectional motives. A desire to believe that one is in a superior group is an example of a directional motive. It directs one toward a particular belief. Nondirectional motives don’t motivate one to accept a particular belief. They include such motivations as the need to know, the need for closure, and others.
There isn’t in general a one-to-one mapping of motives to beliefs. The same motivation can lead to different beliefs, and different motives can lead to the same belief. One person could adopt conservative beliefs from a desire for stability, while another could for other reasons. [Jost 2003, p. 341]
Jost and his collaborators in this study took the view that the two core aspects of political conservatism are
The authors considered Altemeyer’s RWA or Wilson and Patterson’s C scale to be indicators of general resistance to change. They considered Adorno’s F scale, the SDO, the Economic System Justification Scale, the Economic Conservatism Scale, or the General Conservatism Scale to be measures of acceptance of inequality. (Recall that this paper is a review of existing research, so the team had no control over what measures were available. In accepting a variety of related definitions, they increased the number of studies they could use in their analysis.) [Jost 2003, p. 344]
This view of conservatism differs somewhat from that I took in my essay “What Conservatism Is”. In terms of RWA and SDO, it combines one major factor of each.
The studies that these authors base their conclusions on are correlative studies. They indicate when there is a statistically significant and practically significant correlation between pairs of measurements. Causation could be in either direction, or there could be no causation at all. Causation in most of these cases is still an open question. The names of these characteristics should in most cases be thought of as labels. They measure what they measure, which I will try to describe when it is not clear.
Cognitive motivators may include epistemic motives (dogmatism, intolerance of complexity, cognitive complexity, close-mindedness, uncertainty avoidance, needs for order, structure, and closure); existential motives (self-esteem, terror management, fear, threat, anger, and pessimism); or ideological motives (self-interest, group dominance, and system justification). These various potential motivators can all be linked to fears and anxieties which may be managed through adoption of the two conservative planks, reluctance to change and embrace of inequality. Inequality may be linked to existential motives through system justification and/or belief in a just world. The theoretical basis of this area of study then suggests that, on the individual and population levels, many related factors may facilitate a conservative ideology. [Jost 2003, p. 351]
There is strong evidence that dogmatism, as measured by Rokeach’s Dogmatism scale, is correlated with various measures of conservatism and authoritarianism at r levels from .20 up to .82. That scale includes items such as:
Belief in a connection between conservatism and dogmatism goes back to Adorno’s “authoritarian personality“ research. Investigators have suggested that dogmatism should apply symmetrically as a motivator for both right- and left-wing ideologues. Research on this is so far inconclusive. [Jost 2003, p. 353]
Integrative complexity is a measurement that can be applied to written or spoken language. It measures the degree of differentiation used to understand issues and the integration or connection of the components to justify or arrive at a position. Another view is that high integrative complexity is shown when an issue is analyzed based on effects on various parties, and solutions are sought that result in compromise or recasting the issue to allow for a wider range of more-acceptable outcomes. Low integrative complexity is shown in analysis that avoids complexity by relying on general principles.
Studies of integrative complexity in politics have used speeches, writings, and interviews with national legislators in the U. S. and Britain, and decisions of U. S. Supreme Court justices. Related studies have been made using undergraduates from the U.S., Canada, and Sweden. These studies have consistently found higher complexity among liberals and centrists and lower complexity among conservatives, with an overall r of -.20 over twenty studies of integrative complexity and similar measures. Although a small number of studies showed lower complexity on both ideological extremes, this result was not consistent.
Some of these studies, those using the public statements of elected officials, evaluate their public explanations of their positions, not necessarily their process in arriving at those positions. They may therefore be supposed to reflect the complexity tolerance of the target audience. [Jost 2003, p. 353]
Openness to experience is one of the “Big Five” personality dimensions that have been broadly used since around 2000. Openness includes several facets, including active imagination, aesthetic sensitivity, attentiveness to inner feelings, preference for variety, and intellectual curiosity. Twenty-one studies studying conservatism in relation to openness and its relatives (sensation seeking, valuing broad-mindedness, valuing imaginativeness, and valuing an exciting life) found a consistently negative r ranging from -.14 to -.54, with an average of -.32. Among these were one study which found an r of -.28 with SDO, another r of -.19 with a measure of adherence to economic laissez-faire, and four studies showing an r of about -.35 with RWA. [Jost, 2003, p. 355]
“Uncertainty avoidance” has been proposed as a trait related to conservatism by numerous researchers. While there is no agreed-upon measurement scale for this trait, statistically significant negative correlations were found in ten of thirteen studies that correlated conservatism, measured via the Wilson/Patterson C scale, and various forms of discomfort with complexity or uncertainty. More-conservative subjects had lower preference for: complex paintings, complex poems, unfamiliar music, ambiguous literature, job insecurity, task variety, change at work, new technology, work innovation, and attempts at innovation. The combined r for the thirteen studies was -.27. [Jost, 2003, p. 356]
The need for personal order and structure can be measured by the Personal Need for Structure Scale. Two of three studies measuring the need for order and structure found statistically significant correlation between this need and conservatism. The average r obtained in these two studies was .29. Altemeyer found an r of .34 between Personal Need for Structure and RWA, but found a non-significant relation between Personal Need for Structure and SDO. [Jost, 2003, p. 358]
The Need For Closure Scale (NFC) uses forty-two questions and its overall score measures roughly the same inclination as does the Personal Need for Structure scale. The NFC breaks down into five factors: need for order, need for predictability, need for decisiveness, intolerance of ambiguity, and closed-mindedness. (The Need for Closure Scale) NFC measures a nondirectional cognitive motive. Its questions reference no political issues. NFC has correlated strongly with a range of measures of conservatism, including the F scale, party orientation, self-identification as conservative, and support for the death penalty. The combined r of seventeen studies is .26. [Jost, 2003, p. 358]
A social worldview is a “coherent system of beliefs about the nature of the social world, specifically, [beliefs] about what people are like, how they are likely to behave to one, and how they should be responded to and treated.” A dangerous/threatening social worldview includes the “belief that the social world is a dangerous and threatening place in which good, decent people’s values and way of life are threatened by bad people” versus a “belief that the social world is a safe, secure and stable place in which almost all people are fundamentally good.” (Belief in a Dangerous World) [Duckitt 2001, p. 69]
Students of conservatism have often proposed that conservatism may be related in part to heightened anxiety over living in a dangerous world. Studying the Belief in a Dangerous World scale in relation to RWA, Altemeyer and Duckitt in separate studies found high correlations, with r ranging from .45 to .54. Duckitt also found an r of .15 to .29 between Belief in a Dangerous World and SDO.
In separate studies relating RWA to response latency to words signifying danger, Lavine and associates found an r of .17 or .26 using two slightly different methods. These studies demonstrate not only that conservatives tend to more concern about dangers, but also that this happens unawares. Altogether, Jost et al. estimated the r between fear/anxiety and conservatism at .30. [Jost 2003, p. 362]
Quite frequently in the conservatism literature you see a connection between fear or threat on the one hand and conservatism on the other. It is usually described as a correlation between fear/threat and conservatism, and it seems to imply that conservatives are scaredy-cats. The evidence, however, is that conservatives are unusually alert and responsive to threat.
When we think in lay terms about fear, we associate fear with avoidance. I believe that the research findings are consistent with a different view. I think it’s reasonable (and more accurate) to say that conservatives are alert, responsive to, and even attracted to threat. This would explain why conservative news outlets can continue to engage viewer attention by endlessly reiterating images that are ostensibly frightening and threatening to their viewers. Perhaps conservatives are “frightened” by non-conformance in the same way that horror-film fans are “frightened” by violence.
Regulatory focus theory proposes (amongst other things) that one’s attitude toward a proposal may be focused either on the potential up-side or the potential down-side. If a focus on potential loss is regular, the individual may be seen as pessimistic (risk-averse) rather than optimistic. Since a general aversion to change is a core characteristic of conservatism, it’s been proposed that an orientation toward loss prevention might exist among conservatives.
There has been little testing of this idea. One study, conducted just in advance of the 1996 U.S. presidential election, tested the effects of an up-side oriented message in favor of voting versus a down-side message. It found that high RWAs responded more strongly to the loss-prevention message.
Non-political research has been able to evoke a prevention focus in experimental tasks by emphasizing the costs and likelihood of negative outcomes. (Thus, regulatory focus is dynamic.) They’ve found that in a prevention stance, solutions to the experimental challenge were characterized by lower cognitive complexity, more mental rigidity, narrowing of solution options, and a tendency to place a higher value on things already in possession because they were already in possession, which is called the “endowment effect.” [Jost 2003, p. 364]
While we all know that some day we will graduate from this world, the prominence or relevance of that knowledge can vary naturally and within experimental procedures. A 1972 study involving CSU undergrads found a very high r, 0.54, between fear of death and Wilson and Patterson’s C scale.
A series of experiments examined the bail decisions of real municipal judges who were or were not exposed to reminders of their own evanescence. Those whose mortality was made accessible set bail at an average $455, those whose mortality was not artificially salient, at $50! Multiple studies have shown that psychological closeness to death and its attendant emotions increased the defense of cultural norms and reduced tolerance of out-groups. Several studies have found that this effect occurs with high authoritarians but not with low authoritarians. One study found that mortality salience increases tolerance among liberals. [Jost 2003, p. 364]
Threat to the system could well be hard to study by experiment, but there have been a large number of “natural experiments” which provide evidence that threats to the system do increase conservative attitudes. These results show that threat tends to increase defense of the current system, and that this effect is stronger among the more conservative. One set of studies showed that during the decade of the depression, people were more likely to join “authoritarian” churches (Southern Baptist and Seventh Day Adventist) and less likely to join less-authoritarian churches (Northern Baptist and Episcopalian). In the decade before the depression, a decade of relative prosperity, the trend was opposite.
More recently, during economic good times in Seattle (1962, 65, and 66), conversions to the “authoritarian” Roman Catholic church were down and conversions to the United Presbyterian church were up. During hard economic times (1961, 64, 69, and 70), the trends were reversed. Related studies found that Philadelphia and New York city allocated relatively more to police budgets compared to fire budgets during the depression, despite lower crime rates. [Jost 2003, p. 365]
Additional studies compared police versus fire budget allocations during a time of relative social peace (1959-64) compared to a period of social conflict (1967-69). They found a large increase in police budget allocations during the later period.
A 1997 study used a panel of history professors to evaluate how much economic, political, and social stress was present in all the presidential election years from 1788 to 1992, and found that candidates at high-stress times were also rated as “high on power motivation, forcefulness, and strength.”
Altogether, Jost et al. found an r of .47 between perceived threat to the social system and politically conservative choices and judgments, in those studies that allowed such an estimate to be made.
In their review of studies that related conservatism to possible cognitive motivators, the group found strong evidence of correlations ranging from .32 to .50 for:
In two of these (dogmatism and lack of openness to experience), the correlations were between measurements of those traits and measurements of the conservatism of subjects. In the remaining three, the correlations were based on actual behaviors in experimental or natural conditions.
The group found convincing evidence with smaller correlations ranging from .18 to .27 for:
Motivated cognition can strike anywhere and anytime. Some amount of cognition is involved when making decisions throughout life, so motivated cognition can be involved while youngsters are deciding what they believe, and again and again as issues and conflicts arise throughout their lives. Logical cognition is more likely when the mood is cool, when apposite information is at hand, and the intellectual skills needed to use that information are there. Motivated cognition is more likely under stress and where information is difficult to discern.
Motivated cognition probably has a compounding effect. Once a decision is made about the locus and nature of moral standards, examination of one’s own soul may cease. Once a decision is made that feelings and not knowledge are relevant to political decisions, knowledge may become not only unimportant but noxious. Once a decision is made to defer to authority, intellectual skills are no longer a moral responsibility. Once you decide that you’ll “never use” mathematics, you never will. Abstract thinking? F’getaboutit! And so on....
There is no claim in Jost’s paper, nor would I claim, that motivated cognition is more at work or more effective among conservatives than among progressives. The study does, however, show that these particular motivators are more effective among conservatives than among liberals. I do claim, and I suspect that many researchers would agree, that motivated cognition is more problematic in conservatism, if for no other reason, then because of authoritarians’ authoritarianism.
This study does not establish that motivated cognition causes conservative belief. Such a conclusion would require difficult and expensive additional research, for which the authors call out the need. The likely result of such research at most would establish that cognitive motivators are at work, and that their effects vary among individuals.
This study does establish that factors known to influence cognitive results are alive and active in conservative thinking. It also suggests a number of techniques by which the concerns of consevatives can be dynamically increased; increasing uncertainty or ambiguity; increasing complexity; suggesting system threat; suggesting disorder.
Next: A Causal Chain for Conservatism?
More information:
[Jost 2003] “Political Conservatism as Motivated Social Cognition,” Jost, John T., Glaser, Jack, Kruglanski, Arie W., and Sulloway, Frank J., 2003, “Psychological Bulletin,” Vol. 129, 2003.
© 2021, Ross A. Hangartner